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INSTRUCTIONS:
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before you begin.
Answer FOUR (4) questions. Question 1 and 2 are COMPULSORY and choose any
other TWO (2) questions.
Ouestion I
The following questions are based on the case provided:
(a) Explain type of control(s) that the managers of
hyperinfl ationary economies
(b) Why does inflation cause problems in measuring the
manasement in Brazil?
companies faced in
[5 marks]
performance of Shell
[10 marks]
(d)
(g) Did the management of Shell Brasil's lubricants business perform better in 1984
or 1t85?tl[hy?
[5 marks]
Assume that as the manager of the Planning and Development department in the
Personnel division, you are preparing a proposal regarding performance-based
compensation for your immediate superior, Mr. Mill, to present at a meeting in
April 1986. Would you recoilrmend introduction of some form of financial
performance-based compensation in Shell Brasil? What would you recommend
if the Cruzado plan works? What if it does not work?
[15 marks]
Does it make a difference if Shell Brasil is owned by a foreign firm?
[5 marks]
(e)
1t?
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Ouestion 2
According to Merchant, cultural controls are designed to encourage mutual monitoring,
an often-powerful social pressure exerted by groups and individuals within the groups
who deviate from the groups' norms and values. Meanwhile, Lebas and Weigenstein
propose that other than culture acts as a contol mechanism, market and rule are also able
to control human behaviors.
Define and describe the types of control systems proposed by Lebas and Weigenstein,
and their relationship to each other.
[20 marks]
Ouestion 3
(a) Contingency theory states that the design and use of control systems is dependent
upon the context of the organizational setting.
Based on the above statement, discuss the relevancy of contingency theory for
management contror systems at the managerial level. 
[10 marks]
Agency theory is another approach to examine management control systems.
Discuss how senior manager-executive relationship can create an effective
control system. Give example and type of controls and are applicable to this
relationship.
[10 marks]
Ouestion 4
Profit and investnent centers often supply products or services to other profit or
investment centers within the same corporation. When that happens, some mechanism
for determining the prices of the transfer must be established. This is known as transfer
price. Primarily, there are five types of transfer pricing. Discuss these five primary
transfers pricing that uue commonly used in a corporation and give examples
(manufacturing or service industry).
[20 marks]
o)
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Ouestion 5
(a) Measuring performance of the manager has always been an issue for determining
the measurement as well as the type of rewards. Explain the strengths and
weaknesses of utilizing accounting measures in determining managerial
performance. Give examples.
[10 marks]
(c)
What is relative performance evaluation? Do you agree it is the best method to
evaluate managerial performance? Explain.
[5 marks]
Explain and give two types of incentives for business unit managers and give
examples.
[5 marks]
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OUESTION 1
Shell Brasil S.A.: Performance Evaluation in the Oit Produi.cts Division
In early March 1986, Roberto Boetger, vice presi-
dent of the Oil Products Division of Shell Brasil
S.A., rvas considering a major change in the control
systems in his division. The previous week the
Brazilian government had announced the Cruzado
Pian, rvhich introduced far-reaching economic and
financial reforms, including a change in the national
currency and a general one-year price freeze. The
government plan, rvhich took the country by sur-
prise, intended to reduce annual inflation rates from
255 percent to less than 10 percent. Boetger felt
that, with the Cruzado PIan in place, it might norv
be feasible to evaluate managers more objectively,
based on financial measures of performance, in-
stead of relying on subjective evaluations.
"Up to norv, it has been relatively difficult to
hold people responsible for not meeting the bud-
get, because of the masking effects of many fac-
tors that are outside the manager's control, such
as rvidely fluctuating inflation and exchange rates.
If the Cruzado PIan is successful and inflation
rates drop to 20 percent or less and stabilize, the
budget targets rvill be much more meaningful. We
could use actual vs. budget comparisons for evalu-
ating managerial performance and, possibly, for
providing managerial incentives. The problem is
that rve can still expect some residual effects of in-
flation and exchange rates to influence perform-
ance significantly in the future. Can rve really tell,
then, by comparing budget vs. actual, if a manager
has done a good job?"
COi\IPANY BACI(GROUI$D
Shell Brasil S.A. rvas the largest private com-
pany in Brazil and a rvholly orvned subsidiary of
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the largest corpora-
tion in the rvorld outside the United States. The
parent group had operating companies in over
100 countries in businesses such as oil and nat-
ural gas, chemicals, metals, and coal. In 1985 the
group reported earnings of $3.9 billion in the oil
business only, making it the largest oil company
rvorldrvide.
Shell Brasil rvas organized into three main
divisions: oil products, chemicals, and metals (see
Exhibit 1 for the organization chart). Besides
these businesses, Shell had recently diversified
into rvhat it called nontraditional brrsinesses, such
as asphalt, motels (situated along highrvays, close
to some of Shell's gas stations in the countryside),
and a joint venture in forestry dedicated to grorv-
ing eucalyptus and pine trees, rvhich could be used
for rvood pellets, an alternative source of energy.
The oil business rvas subject to extensive
government control. The government oil com-
pany, Petrobras, had a monopoly on oil explo-
ration, and regulations also restricted oil distribu-
tion. For example, gas stations rvere not allorved
to open during rveekends since the oil price
shocks; the location of gas stations was limited to
certain areas: and distributors had to order oil
supplies from Petrobras according to quotas, rvith
lead times of up to three months. The government
also set retail prices, rvhich rvere updated periodi-
cally, according to cost information provided by
all oil companies operating in Brazil.
Shell Brasil competed in the distribution of
various oil products, acting both as a rvholesaler
to large clients (such as aviation companies) and
as a retailer, throu-gh a netrvork of 3,500 gas sta-
tions spread around Brazil, of rvhich Shell orvned
about 30 percent, the rest belonging to franchis-
ers.In the parts of the oil industry rvhere the gov-
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ernment allowed private investments, Shell also
operated as a manufacturer. In the production of
lubricants, for example, the market leader rvas the
government enterprise, Petrobras, with 23 percent
market share, followed closely by Shell, with 21
percent market share. The Oil Products Division
thus had a manager in charge of supplies and dis-
tribution of all of Shell's oil products, and an op-
erations manager, responsible for manufacturing.
The Oil Products Division had succeeded consis-
tently, generating 60 percent of Shell Brasil's total
sales volume and 70 percent of its profits. Despite
price controls that limited operating margins in
gasoline distribution to 2.5 percent, the oil busi-
ness was a great cash generator with practically
no credit sales.
Ai corporate, several services rvere provided
to the operating divisions, as can be seen in Ex-
hibit 1. In the Finance Division, the legal depart-
ment was responsible for relations with share-
holders, for taxes, and for legal support to the
personnel functions at the operating levels. The
treasury rvas a critical department for Shell Brasil,
since it centralized the management of cash from
all the different businesses. Daily this department
dealt rvith about US$7 million. as a result of cash
sales from the oil and chemical divisions. To keep
idle cash to a minimum, the treasury department
kept tight controls over the operations and main-
tained accounts with 18 different banks rvith
branches all over Brazil.
PLAI\D{ING AND BUDGETING
The planning cycle at Shell Brasil consisted of
three main stages: strategic planning.long-term fi-
nancial planning, and operational budgeting.
Strategic planning involved forming macroeco-
nomic scenarios for the next 20 years and prepar-
ing the Country Plan Documentation (CPD).
CPD focused on a time horizon of three years,
and had the objective of quantifying the strategies
necessary to meet the corporate goals. However,
at this first stage management could not quantify
some strategies in detail, so they presented targets
such as maintain market share or the Oil Products
Division has to be a cash generator.
Targets rvere often differentiated according
to geographical characteristics. For instance,
rvithin the Oil Products Division targets varied
depending on whether the unit rvas located in a
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metropolitan region or in the countryside. In the
large cities, service levels and sales volume were
key targets, while in the countryside the emphasis
was on building new gas stations as fast as possi-
ble to guarantee future market share in a fast-
growing segment. The Strategic Plan was aP-
proved by the parent group, generally around the
end of August.
The Long-Term Financial Plan involved a re-
view of the total resources the company would
provide or need in the next five years. [n recent
years, Shell Brasil had consistently needed more
resources than lvhat it provided. The Long-Term
Financial Plan rvas sent for approval to the Parent
group in November..
Operational budgeting, which started in De-
cember, began at the operating division level.
Each manager presented revenue targets (based
on forecasts for each customer account) and cost
estimates for the upcoming year for each of the
various businesses. By year end the three operat-
ing Vice Presidents (Oil Products, Chemicals and
Metals divisions) and the finance and personnel
vice presidents met rvith the President to discuss
and approve the budget.
Once the budget lvas approved, any changes
had to be approved at the vice president level. In
situations lvhere the forecasts proved to be very
far from reality, the division could ask for a bud-
get review, subject to direct approval by the Presi-
dent. Only a major disruption, however, such as a
variation of 200 percent in the expected inflation
rate, would cause a change in the plans. As John
Beith, in charge of corporate planning' explained,
"Variances are an essential part of any planning
effort. In fact. one of the few things rve can be
sure about when putting a plan together is that
we'll miss it! Brazilians sometimes tend to have a
lot of expectations about the numbers in their
plans, and later, rvhen they find, year after year,
that they missed the plan because of some unfore-
seen circumstances, they get so disappointed that
some people simply lose their confidence in any
plan."
PERF OR.UIANCE T\IEASUREtrIENT
The operating divisions at Shell Brasil were evalu-
ated on the basis of return on investment. Return
was measured as profit after taxes and interest
rates. The budget contained targets defined for
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three levels of profrtability, called Margin I, Mar-
gin II, and Margin III, as shown in Exhibit 2.Mar-
gin I was a gross profit number. Margin II rvas di-
vision profit before allocations of indirect costs.
Margin III was a fully allocated profit number, net
of taxes. When computing the return on invest-
ment, Margin III was divided by total assets em-
ployed (defined as net working capital plus fixed
assets). When Margin III was negative, manage-
ment had to use Margin II to compute the return
on investment. This happened in 1984 and 1985,
but generally Margin III was the ultimate crite-
rion for measuring profits. Despite continuous ef-
forts by top management to find the best possible
bases for allocating corporate costs at the division
level, many managers still considered Margin III
an unreliable indicator of the true contribution of
the profit center to the performance of the whole
company, because it depended on many factors
outside the manager's control.
During the year each operating division pre-
pared special reports for monthly, quarterly, and
semiannual reviews. These reports compared ac-
tual results with the plans. Managers had to pro-
vide detailed explanations of the causes for vari-
ances only when failing by more than 5 percent to
meet profitability targets. Managers often felt that
it was much harder to explain unfavorable vari-
ances, so most of them preferred to set conserva-
tive targets.
Performance evaluation meetinss were held
every six months. Division .nanag"rs-had to rank
all their subordinates according to how rvell they
had met financial rargets and other objectives,
such as participating in leadership training pro-
grams, increasing sales volume, or opening new
gas stations. In a first round, all employees in a di-
vision had to rank their peers (other employees at
the same job level), and then each boss rvould re-
vierv and consolidate the rankings of the subordi-
nates. The personnel division collected these
rankings with individual evaluation reports. The
data were used for career planning, management
succession, training, and internal transfer pro-
grams, as well as merit wage increases. Managers
at all levels had to conduct interviews for prepar-
ing evaluation reports with each subordinlte.-To-
gether they identified the factors that facilitated
or prevented the achievement of each goal, in-
cluding those that could not be quantifild. The
boss rvas also expected to serve as i counselor on
6
career plans and to provide alternatives
proving performance.
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for im-
Shell had attempted to reduce subjectivity in
the evaluation process by setting performance
targets at the beginning of each year and by quan-
tifying the performance measures as much as pos-
sible.'Some managers still felt uncomfortable,
holever, about giving a bad evaluation to their
subordinates. In some instances managers ranked
half of their subordinates as perfectly acceptable
and the other half as very good.The problem rvas
aggravated when the manager had to justify why
his or her unit performed poorly if all subordi-
nates had done such a good job.
ISOLATING TINCONTROLLABLES
In 1985 top management made some attempts to
separate controllables from uncontrollables in the
performance measures. Ian Wilson, corporate
controller, commented: "I_Incontrollables are our-
side factors that make you realize that you can't
rely only on your own resources. Managers should
be evaluated solely on their individual contribu-
tion." Llnfortunately, however, management had
difficulty in defining what was controllable.
For example, in the Oil Products Division, if a
manager was responsible for opening new gas sta-
tions in the countryside, and despite all efforts in
developing good plans for this operation, govern-
ment officials decided not to grant the necessary
authorization, then the manager rvould not be held
responsible for failing to open the nerv stations
But if the manager disrupted some relationships
with government officials because proper autho-
rization was denied for the nerv gas stations, then
the manager could be demoted, perhaps even fired.
Another example rvould be the frequent oil
price increases. Approximately once a month the
government determined price increases for differ-
ent oil products, including gasoline. If a manager
could forecast more or less accurately rvhen the
price increase rvould come, he or she could maxi-
mize inventory just before that day, and then sell
everything later at the greater price. This gain
could amount to a boost of about US$20 million
in profits for a company as large as Shell.
To take advantage of these gains, some of
Shell's competitors adopted various procedures
not to sell just before the price increase was ex-
pected. For example, they would allege that deliv-
r22
...7/-
ery irucks had broken dolvn or that the pumPs
lvere out of order in some gas stations, or they
would intentionally reduce service levels to create
large lines of customers. As a manager in the Oil
Products Division commented, "We at Shefl con-
sider such procedures unethical. However, there
are some ordinary business steps that a manager
can take to maximize the gains with the oil price
increases. For instance, a manager could antici-
pate purchases to maximize inventory around the
time rvhen he or she expects the price increase to
occur. Should rve rervard such a manager even if
the underlying cause for the large gains-the
price increase announced by the government-
rvas outside the manager's control?"
Tvvo uncontrollable factors, inflation and the
fluctuation in exchange rates, typically had a Par-
ticularly significant impact on performance mea-
surement. sometimes with opposite effects. This
led management to consider explicitly these ef-
fects in computing Margins II and III.
A. Inflation:
Brazilian inflation rates, as high as 250 per-
cent, caused major distortions in financial state-
ments. Nevertheless, government regulations lim-
ited the adjustments that companies could make
to account for inflation, allorving adjustments in
just a ferv accounts. such as fixed assets. Due to
other restrictions in the tax larvs, companies in
Brazil tended to use the same reporting system
for tax and financial purposes. Thus, a large part
of the reported results depended on the relative
changes in prices over the period.In the Oil Prod-
ucts Division, for instance, management estimated
that about 50 to 60 percent of reported profits
rvere caused merely by inflation. For internal pur-
poses, management prepared what if reports, that
shorved actual results adjusted for what they
rvould have been, had inflation been just as ex-
pected. Even so, ferv people could understand the
effects of inflation on various accounts. Some
managers could enumerate between 20 and 30 ef-
fects of inflation rvith different magnitudes and
rvhich could have a positive or negative impact on
the various line items in the budget. It was very
hard to assess lvhat their net result would be. The
hardest effects to predict rvere changes in relative
prices (e.g., horv rvould the price of a finished
product vary, compared with the variation in the
price of one or more of its inputs).
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As an approximation, management com-
puted an inflationary loss estimate, according to
the formula:
Inflationary Loss : Inflation Adjustment
X NetWorking CaPital
where:
Inflation Adjustment Percent adjustment that the
government allorved for
accounting for inflation during
the period.
Net Working Capital Balance, in U.S. dollars.
ou$tanding at the beginning of
. 
the period.
Margin I, less the Inflationary Loss and Di-
rect Costs, resulted in rvhat was called Margin II'
From Margin II the divisions deducted the Indi-
rect Costs, and the result (Profit Before Taxes)
rvas the basis for computing tax liability or sav-
ings. The total tax liability or savings for the com-
pany arose from consolidating the above compu-
tations supplied by each division.
B. Exchange Rate Changes:
Shell Brasil set budgets in dollars for all the
different businesses, and used the targets con-
tained in those bud-gets to control the perform-
ance of its general managers. Top management
believed thit results in dollars. rather than
cruzeiros, better reflected real performance. One
reason was that targets expressed in dollars rvould
not be subject to the effects of the inflation of the
cruzeiro, only to the inflation in dollars, which had
been comparatively much smaller. Another rea-
son was that the use of profitability measures de-
nominated in dollars facilitated comparisons rvith
the international competitive environment. Some
managers, holvever, rvondered rvhy they should be
held responsible for fluctuations in the exchange
rates. Ttrey argued that they did their business in
cruzeiros and had no control over exchange rates
that rvere periodically established by the Brazilian
government.
Besides the effects of changes in the value of
the cruzeiro regarding the dollar, financial per-
formance at Shell Brasil rvas also influenced by
fluctuations in the exchange rate between
cruzeiros and British pounds. The Dutch-British
parent sroup required that Shell Brasil rePort its
hnancial statements in British pounds to consoli-
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date the corporate accounts worldwide' And
when the president of Shell Brasil went to Lon-
don to discuss budget reports, he would present
the numbers, taking into consideration explicitly
the effects of fluctuations in the exchange rates.
Devaluations of the cruzeiro concerning for-
eign currencies generally had a net negative effect
on performance. Each time the Brazilian govern-
ment established a new exchange rate, usually to
devalue the cruzeiro, companies received more
cruzeiros for their exports, but meanwhile they
needed more cruzeiros to pay their foreign debt'
Shell Brasil, like many other companies, had a
substantial part of its current liabilities denomi-
nated in dollars and only a small percentage of
revenues derived from exports. Because the gov-
ernment also controlled prices of many of Shell's
products, the end result was that the frequent de-
valuations of the cruzeiro had a significant nega-
tive impact on performance of the different busi-
nesses at Shell.
For internal reporting PurPoses, the effects
of variations in the exchange rates were com-
puted by the Difference in Exchange (DIE) for-
mula, as follows:
Net Working Capital (NWC)
Beginning Exchange Rate
Net Working Capital
-@
Beginning Loss
- In Dollars (BLD)
Variation in NWCBLD +
Average Exch. Rate
Variation in NWC
Ending Exch. Rate
where:
Net Working Capital Beginning Balance, in cruzeiros.
Variation in NWC Difference between Net
Working Capital of two
consecutive periods.
Exchange Rate Expressed as how many
cruzeiros one needed to buY
u.s. s1.
The DIE was deducted from Margin I, along
with the direct costs, and the final result was Mar-
gin II.This Margin II could be very different from
ihe Margin II calculated as Margin I minus direct
costs and the Inflationary Loss, as explained ear-
B
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lier. If one considered the inflationary loss inty,
and not DIE, one would have a measure of what
contribution the division made to the overall
profit of the company, translated from cruzeiros
to dollars at the current exchange rate at the end
of the period.Yet, if one considered DIE only, and
not the inflationary loss in cruzeiros, one would
have a measure of the division's performance in
dollars, allowing for the effect of the changes in
the cruzeiro's value concerning the dollar during
the period being evaluated. Management had to
report the budget variances according to both cri-
teria for computing Margin II (and, consequently,
Margin III).
Exhibit 3 illustrates the evolution of the in-
flation rates of the cruzeiro and the dollar, and
compares it rvith the changes in the exchange rate
of the cruzeiro regarding the dollar, for the period
1981-1985. Respecting performance evaluation,
these large variations in the inflation and ex-
change rates caused major uncontrollable vari-
ances from budget estimates. As a corporate man-
ager explained, "When you receive a budget
report that shows a big loss in dollars due to a ma-jor devaluation of the cruzeiro, or a loss in
cruzeiros due to a jump in inflation, you often feel
like you can't penalize the manager for missing
the budget. However, you would expect that the
manager rvould have reacted to these outside fac-
tors in some tvay, to offset some of these negative
variances."
COMPENSAIION POLICIES
Labor expenses at Shell Brasil accounted for over
50 percent of the company's total operating ex-
penses, or about US$50 million per year. Shell
compensated its managers on a salary basis, at
levels designed to be competitive with total com-
pensation (salary plus bonuses) packages offered
by some large companies surveyed annually.
By 1986 an estimated 55 percent of the ma-
jor companies in Brazil rvould be paying incentive
bonuses. Part of Shell's reluctance to Pay bonuses
or other forms of compensation based on per-
formance stemmed from the tradition among Eu-
ropean companies against incentive plans. As a
Shell executive explained, *We don't want our
managers to be in a situation rvhere one year they
can eirn a big bonus but they earn nothing the
following year."
: DIE
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On some rare occasions, a small number of
Shell managers (usually less than 5 percent of the
total management team) would be eligible for ei-
ther merit increases in salary (often associated
with promotions) or cash bonuses, subject to ap-
proval by the Board of Directors. In its evaluation
the Board emphasized two aspects-individual
contribution and consistency. The individual con-
tribution was defined as outstanding performance
in relation to individual budget targets. Consis-
tency, however, referred to long-term trends in
performance.It was not enough to meet budget in
any given year, because the Board was also look-
ing for a consistent pattern of superior perform-
ance over a longer period, such as three to five
years. The Board also used consistency to grant
merit increases or bonuses to a manager who had
exceptional performance, evefl if his or her divi-
sion had not met budget in the current year. An
obstacle to assessing consistent performance was
that Shell frequently transferred people across
functional departments and divisions to give high-
potential employees varied experiences. There-
fore, managers often had to change positions
every two or three years.
Another problem with bonus payments was
that managers received them only after the previ-
ous year's results had been thoroughly evaluated.
This often delayed the delivery of bonus pay-
ments to midyear. By that time managers rvere al-
ready worried about meeting the current year's
targets.
THE CRUZA\DO PLAN
The Cruzado Plan, which took effect on March L,
1986, was a government attempt to eliminate one
of the factors believed to be a root cause for infla-
tion: the expectations of future inflation based on
past price increases. So far the Brazilian economy
had operated with an indexation system in which
most prices were automatically raised according
to variations in price indexes computed by the
government. For some products, these price in-
creases could occur weekly. The plan introduced
two major reforms addressing this problem-all
prices were frozen as of February 28,1986, and a
new monetary unit was created, the cruzado,
equivalent to 1,000 old cruzeiros. The currency
change was intended to erase inflationary memo-
ries.
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The Cruzado Plan raised many questions
about how to implement the generalized price
freeze. A major concern was that, without the
Plan, wages would have been readjusted on
March 1 to account for inflation (wages in Brazil
used to be adjusted twice a year, in March and
November). Recognizing this, the Plan deter-
mined that wages should now be frozen at their
average real value from the last six months. To
this average, the government decided to add an 8
percent bonus. Furthermore, the Plan established
a sliding scale mechanism that allorved automatic
wage raises if the annual inflation rate reached 20
percent. The PIan also introduced unemployment
benefits for the first time in Brazil. But no one
knerv horv the labor unions would respond.
Another major problem with implementing
of the price freeze was the required revisions in
current long-term contracts. These contracts usu-
ally established adjustments in the periodic pay-
ments according to variations in the inflation or
the exchange rates. Now the Plan prohibited any
contracts (including investments) from having
such provisions. Nevertheless, it was still reason-
able to expect some residual inflation, even with
the new price freeze. The Cruzado Plan consid-
ered this expected residual inflation by establish-
ing a conversion calendar, that translated old
cruzeiros into cruzados for every day of the year
until March 7,7987. Each day one needed more
old cruzeiros to buy one cruzado. For example, on
March 1, 1986, one cruzado was set as equivalent
to 1,000 cruzeiros; six months later, one cruzado
would be equivalent to 2,997.39 cruzeiros. This
conversion calendar allowed for conversions into
the new currency for payments established in
cruzeiros in long-term contracts signed before the
Plan. Another example was that if one had agreed
before the Plan to pay 5 million cruzeiros on Feb-
ruary 28,1987, now one would have to pay about
only 1,000 cruzados on that same date.
THE CRUZAIDO PLAN'S EFFECT
ON SHELI-S MANAGEMENT
A rvave of optimism about the promised stronger
economy swept Shell the day the Plan was an-
nounced, but uncertainty lingered concerning the
repercussions that the Plan would trigger. For ex-
ample, how long could the government enforce
the price freeze? After over twenty years of mili-
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tary government, the first elected president-a
civilian-had certainly strong popular support,
which would provide the much needed help to
implement the Cruzado Plan. Coming elections
for the Congress in November, however, could
change the political scenario substantially, espe-
cially because the new Congress would vote on a
new constitutional reform. It seemed that there
was more uncertainty about the next year than
about the nineties. Despite all uncertainties, Shell
had to continue to set prices and renegotiate con-
tracts with suppliers, banks, and insurance compa-
nies. Top management had to act quickly to send
instructions to all managers, spread out over the
whole country, for the adoption of coherent poli-
cies that might change practically every aspect of
the way they operated in their different busi-
NCSSCS.
The Cruzado Plan particularly affected the
distribution business. Manufacturers used to sell
to rvholesalers offering deferred payment terms
(generally betrveen one to three months) that in-
corporated an inflation forecast. Now, according
to the new conversion calendar, which converted
cruzeiros into cruzados at different rates daily,
wholesalers and retailers would face increasing
costs. This situation, combined with the price
fteeze, caused many managers in the distribution
business to doubt whether they rvould be able to
keep earning their expected returns. Some people
even speculated about a crisis in supplies and the
creation of an underground economy.
Luiz Fortes, Treasurer, perceived an increas-
ing pressure to meet performance targets: "The
Cruzado Plan forces us to look at real returns. For
example, we are all used to thinking about returns
in nominal terms, with a large inflationary compo-
nent built-in. Now only the really best performers
will be able to generate significant real returns
and beat competition." Ian Wilson, the corporate
controller, predicted some positive effects of the
Plan: "It'll be much easier now to compare budget
rvith actual results. We can be more confident
about our forecasts.It's a good opportunity to im-
plement tighter cost controls and to hold people
accountable for financial targets. We'll be able to
ask good questions when somebody misses the
budget. We rvon't have all those masking effects
any more." Some people at corporate, horvever,
remained uncertain about how the Plan would
change the role of budgets in the performance
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evaluation process. Some managers argued that
criteria such as meeting targets for Margin III, for
instance, would be more reliable in the future, be-
cause then costs and other factors would be esti-
mated much more precisely'. Horvever, others ar-
gued that rvith frozen prices managers would have
less control over their results, so that even simpler
criteria, such as Margin I, would not capture the
"real effort" that each person made to accomplish
his or her goals.
William Mills, the vice president of person-
nel, agreed that it was time to review some con-
trol policies: "We may now have a unique oppor-
tunity to introduce some performance-based
compensation plans. There are several alterna-
tives for careful examination. For instance, should
we tie compensation to the performance of the
profit center only? To what extent should we mea-
sure performance over a longer period of time-
say, five years?"
The planning department at corporate
would have to revise most of its macroeconomic
premises, especially about inflation and exchange
rates. If the inflation rate exceeded the devalua-
tion rate of the cruzado concerning the dollar,
Shell Brasil could possibly end up rvith losses in
cruzados but profits in dollars.
AN EXAIIPLE: EVALUATION
OF PERFORIIANCE IN THE
LUBRICANTS BUSINESS
Roberto Boetger, vice president of the Oil Prod-
ucts Division, had just received the latest budget
forecasts for the lubricants business (Exhibit 5)
accompanied by a review of the performance of
this business in the last trvo years (see Exhibits
44' and 4B). The lubricants business, which re-
quired large amounts of working capital, was rep-
resentative of how the inflation and exchange rate
effects could alter the financial results substan-
tially. As shown in Exhibits 4A and 48, the lubri-
cants business missed its budget targets for Mar-
gin II and III in 1984, but did better than budget
in 1985. In both years, management had underes-
timated sales volume. This rvas consistent with a
conservative attitude that some managers at Shell
adopted when preparing budget estimates. In
both 1984 and 1985 management had also under-
estimated inflation, so the actual inflationary loss
produced negative variances in both years.
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Following the other criteria for measuring
Margins II and III, that is, taking into consideration
DIE, both in 1984 and 1985 the actual variation in
exchange rates was much higher than expected.
This led to a bottom line (Margin III) loss of $8 mil-
lion dollars in 1984. However, in 1985 the actual
variation in exchange rates was lower than infla-
tion, causing substantial savings in direct costs.Thus,
the bottom line (Margin III) for 1985 resulted in
neither gains or losses for the lubricants business.
Now, when revierving the budget for the fol-
lorving years, corporate planning expected both
the DIE and the inflationary effects to be much
smaller. Yet, they also expected that the spread
between the variation in exchange rates and infla-
tion would increase substantially. In particular, for
1987 top management estimated that the effect of
inflation would be much smaller than the DIE, so
1l_
that lubricants would report profits in cruzados
(and a consequent payment of taxes), but losses in
dollars. In 1988 management expected these re-
sults to reverse. These forecasts and their underly-
ing assumptions appear in Exhibit 5.
Even assuming that the forecasts for the
next couple of years were reasonably accurate,
top management at Shell Brasil still had to decide
rvhat criteria should be used to assess manage-
ment performance. Should they leave the system
unchanged and continue to depend on more sub-
jective judgements? Or should they rely primarily
on budget standards? If so, should performance
be measured in cruzados. in dollars. or in British
pounds? Should managers be held responsible for
the three levels of profitability-Margins I, II,
and III? What criterii should be used to compure
the profitability margins?
AA[1611
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EXHIBIT I Organization Chart
V.P. Oil Products
R. Boetger
L,2
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EXIIIBIT 2 Format for Evaluation of profitability Levels
oExamples include corporate services such as legal assistance, computer suppon. and audirrng.
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Net Revenues
Less:
Cost of Goods Sold
Margin I
Less:
Plant costs
Administrative expenses
Depreciation
Freight costs
Interests
Sales and distribution
Other direct costs
Total direct costs
Contribution
Less:
Ivlargin II
Less:
Corporate overhead
Publicity and other sales expenses
Other allocated costsa
Total indirect costs
Profit before taxes
Less:
Income taxes
Margin III
Inflationary .
Loss
AAU61I
Inflationary
LossDIE
EXHIBIT 3 Performance of Brazilian Economv
Anrutal Infatiott
Rates (Vo) of:
cRs US$b
Exchange Rues:
Yearly Averages
(CR$/US9)
Vo Change in
Yearly Average
Exchange Rate
1981
1982
1983
1984
i985
88.0
99.7
2tt.0
223.8
235.1
8.9
J.v
3.8
4.0
3.8
98.12
I93.s6
629.U
2,t32.00
7,037.50
97.3
))s 7
238.6
230.0
€omputed as percent change of the Generalized Price Index, from December of lhe previous year rhrough De-
cember of the current year. (Source: Conjunrura Economica).
oConlputed 
as percent change of the Cost of Living Inde.r 
-Total, from December of the previous year rhroughDecember of the current year.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor and Stirtistics.
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'lzEXIITBIT 44 variance Analysis of the Lubricants Business-l9g4 (u.s. $ miilions)
Sudget Actual
Wirh
DIE
Wth
Infation
Wi,h
DIE
l4/ith
Infaion
Net Revenues
Lcss:
Cost of Goods Sold
Marginl
Less:
Direct Costs
DIE Effect
Inflationary Loss
Margin II
Less:
Iodirect Costs
Pro6t (Loss) Before Taxes
Less:
Income Tax Savings
Margin III
Other Data:
Sales Volume (1,000 m3)
Inflation (7o)
% Variation in Exchange Rates (CrS/USS)
l2E
&l
6
34
(7)
128
84
6
.;JJ.I
4S
r6
(l r.l)
?ir
Buclget
140.5
200.0
210.0
l7
(1s)
160
lll
49
4;
r.6
!_
(ls.4)
Ei)
Acnal
168.0
223.8
tig a
160
ltl6
43
a
l6
(12)
(8)
EXHIBIT 48 variance Analysis of the Lubricants Business-19g5 (u.s.s mi'ions)
Budget
tt tIn
DIE
llith
Inf.ation
lVith
DIE
llitlt
Inllatbn
Net Revenues
Less:
Cost of Goods Sold
Margin I
Less:
Direct Cosrs
DIE Effect
Inflarionary Loss
Margin II
Less:
Indirect Costs
Profit (Loss) Before Taxes
Les:
Income Ta.r Savings
Margin III
Other Data:
Sales Volume (1.000 m3)
Infiation (7o)
o/o Variation in Exchange Rates (Cr$/USS)
IJJ
9l
12
JO
(6)
r33
9l
1t
,'
(8)
169
lll
)6
7
39
-;
t2
0
0
0
lov
1u
5E
1
J>
1)
t2
0
0
0
12
(18)
9
(e)
tz
,r)
9
(1 l)
Budget
1j10.5
230.0
220.0
Acil.al
173.0
2l.5.7
230.0
130
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EXHIBIT 5 Forecasts for 1987i1988-Lubricants
Assumptions:
Net Working Capital (Cz$ millions)
Exchange Rates (Cz$/US$)
DIE Effect (US$ millions)
Infl ationary Adj ustment (o/o )
Inflationary Loss (USS millions)
Fo recasts ( US$ millions) :
Margin I
Less:
Direct Costs
Inflationary Loss
DIE
lvlargin II
Less:
Indirect Costs
Profit Before Taxes
Less:
IncomeTax (45%)
lvlargin III
Beginning Enr!ing Ending
851.2 914.6
23.0 37 .0
14.4
53.2
19.7
447.0
15.0
lVith
DIE
47.9
ro. I
L4J
L7.7
13.0
4.7
f.o
to nl
---ooo000ooo---
651 .2
2-i.0
It'itlt
Infdrion
47.9
16. I
6.-l
__=
a< I
).h
6.li
lwth
DIE
Wth
Inflation
49.8
16.3
t4.4
-
13.0
o.r
0.4
5;7
49.8
lo.5
t9.7
__=
r3.8
13.0
0.8
0.4
0.4
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